India

Centre Defends Sabarimala Entry Restriction as Essential Religious Practice Before Supreme Court

By Editorial Team
Tuesday, April 7, 2026
5 min read
Share Hub
View of the Sabarimala temple complex bathed in morning light
View of the Sabarimala temple complex bathed in morning light

Centre Defends Sabarimala Entry Restriction as Essential Religious Practice Before Supreme Court

Legal Position Presented by the Centre

Solicitor General Tushar Mehta, appearing on behalf of the Centre, addressed a nine‑judge Constitution bench chaired by Chief Justice Surya Kant. Solicitor General Tushar Mehta asserted that the prohibition on women of menstruating age entering the Sabarimala temple is fundamentally a matter of religious belief and therefore must remain outside the ambit of judicial scrutiny.

Solicitor General Tushar Mehta explained that the restriction is intimately linked to the nature of the deity worshipped at the Sabarimala shrine, Lord Ayyappa, who is revered as a “Naishtika Brahmachari”, an eternal celibate. According to Solicitor General Tushar Mehta, the prohibition on women within a certain age bracket is a direct expression of that theological understanding and has been observed for generations.

The Centre argued that any judicial intervention that alters this long‑standing custom could transform the very character of worship at the Sabarimala shrine. The Centre contended that the rights of devotees who adhere to the established customs would be compromised if the restriction were lifted.

Solicitor General Tushar Mehta maintained that the restriction does not infringe the constitutional guarantee of equality. The Centre emphasized that the matter pertains to faith‑based practice rather than a question of gender bias, and therefore must be examined within the broader context of India’s pluralistic traditions.

Critique of the "Constitutional Morality" Doctrine

Solicitor General Tushar Mehta warned the Supreme Court against adopting a model of review that measures religious practice against criteria such as rationality, modernity, scientific defensibility, or popular acceptance. Solicitor General Tushar Mehta argued that such a test would amount to substituting judicial philosophy for the self‑understanding of the faith community, a role for which the Supreme Court does not possess the requisite expertise.

According to Solicitor General Tushar Mehta, the Constitution safeguards religious freedom precisely because the protected field encompasses convictions, rituals, disciplines and forms of worship that may not satisfy secular standards of reason, utility or majority preference. The Centre therefore submitted that the Constitution does not prescribe a universal metric of "constitutional morality" as a basis for judging the validity of an essential religious practice.

Solicitor General Tushar Mehta further highlighted that the phrase "constitutional morality" does not appear in the text of the Constitution. Instead, the Centre described it as a judicially created, vague and indeterminate notion. By expanding the term "morality" to incorporate a concept that the Constitution never explicitly defined, the Centre asserted that the Supreme Court would be engaging in judicial overreach, effectively amending the Constitution without proper authority.

The Centre warned of an inherent risk whenever the Supreme Court attempts to interpret the doctrines of any religion. The Centre argued that such interpretation could set a precedent for the judiciary to intrude upon the internal theological doctrines that are traditionally the preserve of religious scholars.

Procedural Context and Earlier Judicial Pronouncements

The Supreme Court, in managing the hearing schedule, instructed all counsels to adhere strictly to the prescribed timetable, noting that other matters of urgency required attention. The hearing on the Sabarimala matter continues under the supervision of Chief Justice Surya Kant.

In a prior decision, a five‑judge Constitution bench, by a majority of four to one, struck down the ban that prevented women between the ages of ten and fifty from entering the Sabarimala shrine. That bench held that the centuries‑old restriction was unconstitutional and violated the fundamental right to equality.

Subsequently, a five‑judge bench led by a then Chief Justice Ranjan Gogoi, by a narrow majority of three to two, referred the controversy surrounding the exclusion of women from various places of worship to a larger bench for further consideration. The larger bench was tasked with examining broad issues relating to freedom of religion across different faith traditions.

The larger bench framed several pivotal questions concerning the scope of religious freedom, emphasizing that such questions could not be resolved in the abstract but required a factual examination of the specific practices at issue.

Beyond the Sabarimala dispute, the larger bench was asked to consider analogous issues, including the entry of Muslim women into mosques and dargahs, as well as the right of Parsi women married to non‑Parsi men to partake in rituals at Agiary fire‑temples.

In preparation for the final arguments, the Supreme Court outlined a set of seven questions intended to delineate the boundaries of religious freedom and the appropriate parameters for judicial review. Those questions remain central to the ongoing deliberations before the bench chaired by Chief Justice Surya Kant.

Core Arguments Advanced by the Centre

  • Essential Religious Practice: The Centre asserts that the prohibition on women of menstruating age is an essential component of the worship of Lord Ayyappa, rooted in the deity’s status as an eternal celibate.
  • Preservation of Devotee Rights: The Centre argues that altering the practice would infringe upon the rights of devotees who have historically observed the restriction as part of their religious observance.
  • Constitutional Protection of Faith: The Centre emphasizes that the Constitution explicitly protects the freedom to practice religion, even when such practices do not conform to contemporary notions of rationality or scientific validation.
  • Absence of Textual Basis for "Constitutional Morality": The Centre maintains that the Constitution does not contain the phrase "constitutional morality", rendering any judicial reliance on that concept an overextension of judicial power.
  • Risk of Judicial Overreach: The Centre cautions that permitting the Supreme Court to interpret the doctrinal tenets of any faith could set a dangerous precedent for future interference in religious matters.

Solicitor General Tushar Mehta concluded by urging Chief Justice Surya Kant and the remaining members of the bench to refrain from imposing a modern, secular yardstick on a practice that is intrinsically tied to the theological identity of Lord Ayyappa and the faith community that venerates the deity.

Report compiled from court proceedings and statements made by Solicitor General Tushar Mehta representing the Centre before the Supreme Court.
#sensational#india#global#trending

More from India

View All

Latest Headlines