Centre Requests Supreme Court to Classify Its Adultery Decriminalisation Verdict as Not Good Law

The Centre has approached the Supreme Court with a petition seeking a formal declaration that the judgment decriminalising adultery in the Joseph Shine v. Union of India case does not constitute good law. The petition centres on a critique of the doctrinal foundation upon which the Supreme Court based its decision, rather than a challenge to the outcome that rendered Section 497 of the IPC unconstitutional.

In written submissions filed in the context of ongoing deliberations concerning another prominent case, the Centre articulated a position that the Supreme Court’s reliance on the notion of “constitutional morality” was overly expansive and insufficiently anchored in concrete legal principles. The Centre described this reliance as an adoption of a “judicially evolved, vague, and indeterminate concept” that, in the Centre’s view, undermines the stability of statutory interpretation.

According to a report by NDTV, the Centre’s submissions emphasize that the Supreme Court should refrain from grounding binding legal rulings on selective academic writings, foreign judicial pronouncements, or the personal philosophical inclinations of individual judges. The Centre contended that such an approach risks eroding the doctrinal clarity required for the coherent application of law across the nation.

Section 497 of the IPC historically criminalised the act of a man engaging in sexual relations with a married woman without the consent of her husband, thereby framing adultery as a punishable offence. The Supreme Court, in the Joseph Shine v. Union of India case, struck down Section 497 on the ground that the provision was discriminatory and contravened constitutional guarantees of equality. The Centre’s present petition does not seek to revive Section 497; rather, it questions the broader jurisprudential premises that informed the Supreme Court’s decision.

The Centre’s critique is anchored in a concern that the Supreme Court elevated “constitutional morality” to a standalone test for judicial review, effectively positioning it in opposition to “societal morality.” The Centre argued that this framing creates a conceptual dichotomy that could diminish the doctrine of separation of powers, by allowing the judiciary to substitute its own moral calculus for the legislative intent embodied in statutory enactments.

Further, the Centre expressed unease about the Supreme Court’s practice of referencing foreign legal materials and scholarly opinions to shape domestic constitutional interpretation. The Centre maintains that while comparative law can be instructive, it should not become a primary source for defining the contours of constitutional morality within the national legal framework.

The petition submitted by the Centre arrives at a moment when the Indian legal community is engaged in vigorous debate over the scope of judicial review, the proper interpretation of Articles dealing with freedom of religion, and the extent to which evolving moral philosophies should influence judicial outcomes. The Centre highlighted that the current discourse surrounding “constitutional morality” lacks a settled definition, noting that the concept has shifted across cases depending on the values emphasized by the judiciary at particular junctures.

In its own words, the Centre observed that “constitutional morality is a judicially evolved expression, the contours of which have remained uncertain, shifting from case to case according to the values emphasised in a particular context. At best, it makes it an aspirational interpretive ideal.” This assessment underscores the Centre’s position that reliance on such a fluid concept may lead to inconsistent legal outcomes and jeopardise the predictability of the law.

To provide context, it is useful to recall the legislative history of Section 497. Enacted during the colonial era, the provision originally reflected social norms that regarded a married woman’s sexual agency as inherently linked to the consent of her husband. Over the decades, legal scholars and gender rights advocates argued that the provision entrenched gendered discrimination, treating men as perpetrators and women as property. The Supreme Court’s decision in the Joseph Shine v. Union of India case represented a watershed moment, affirming that the law must evolve in alignment with constitutional guarantees of equality and personal liberty.

Nevertheless, the Centre’s petition does not dispute the principle that adultery should not be criminalised on the basis of gendered bias. The crux of the dispute lies in the methodological path the Supreme Court traversed to reach that conclusion. By challenging the reasoning rather than the result, the Centre signals a desire for a jurisprudential framework that relies more heavily on textual analysis, legislative intent, and established constitutional doctrine, rather than on an expansive, and arguably elusive, notion of morality.

Critics of the Centre’s stance argue that judicial interpretation must occasionally extend beyond the plain words of statutes to accommodate the evolving moral and social fabric of the nation. They contend that the Supreme Court’s invocation of “constitutional morality” was an appropriate response to a law that no longer resonated with contemporary understandings of personal autonomy and gender equality.

Supporters of the Centre’s perspective counter that the proper avenue for reforming statutes lies with the legislature, the body constitutionally vested with the authority to create and amend laws. From this viewpoint, the Supreme Court’s role should be confined to interpreting statutes within the boundaries set by the Constitution, without venturing into the realm of normative moral assessment that lacks a concrete statutory anchor.

The broader implications of the Centre’s petition extend to the manner in which the Indian judiciary navigates the tension between constitutional ideals and societal values. If the Supreme Court were to accept the Centre’s argument that “constitutional morality” is an indeterminate standard, future courts might be compelled to adopt a more restrained approach, limiting themselves to explicit textual mandates and foregoing broader moral reasoning.

Conversely, a rejection of the Centre’s contentions could reinforce the legitimacy of a flexible moral framework that allows the judiciary to address systemic inequities embedded in outdated statutes. This dynamic underscores the delicate balance that must be struck between judicial activism and judicial restraint, a balance that remains at the heart of constitutional discourse in the country.

In sum, the Centre’s petition invites the Supreme Court to re‑evaluate the doctrinal foundations of its own landmark judgment. By asserting that the reasoning behind the decriminalisation of adultery does not constitute good law, the Centre seeks a clarifying pronouncement that could shape the future trajectory of constitutional interpretation, particularly in matters where moral philosophy intersects with statutory mandate.

The outcome of this request will likely influence not only the legal status of similar statutes but also the broader jurisprudential philosophy that guides the Supreme Court in reconciling the Constitution with the evolving moral landscape of the nation.